INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the European Union (EU) adopted its Biodiversity Strategy with an ambitious target to 'halt biodiversity and ecosystem service loss by 2020, to restore ecosystems in so far as is feasible, and to step up the EU contribution to averting global biodiversity loss ' (European Commission 2011) . 1 The strategy sets a range of sub-targets, including successfully implementing the EU-wide Natura 2000 network of protected areas, maintaining and restoring Europe's ecosystems and their services, and improving the role of agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors in conserving biodiversity. Both the Strategy itself and several policy reviews have since recognised that achieving these objectivesboth at the EU and Member State level -depends on the availability and efficient use of financial resources and that insufficient financing is one of the most significant hindrances in implementing biodiversity conservation measures (e.g. European Commission 2015; Milieu, IEEP and ICF 2016) .
Opportunities for increasing the levels of finance for biodiversity through environmental fiscal reform is considered as one of the avenues to mobilise more funding for biodiversity (OECD 2013) . The opportunities for biodiversity linked to fiscal reform can be considered to consist of three elements. Firstly, a range of fiscal instruments can be used to raise revenue to benefit biodiversity. Environmental taxes, which either directly or indirectly support biodiversity, and environmental fees and charges (e.g. nature park entrance fees) can be used to support biodiversity conservation, in particular where the revenues are channelled back to implementing conservation measures (OECD 2013) . Secondly, targeted tax reliefs can be used to incentivise and reward certain biodiversityfriendly activities or behaviour (Oosterhuis 2011) . Thirdly, the redistribution of tax revenues among government levels according to ecological criteria, i.e. so called ecological fiscal transfers (EFT), can be used to support the delivery of conservation objectives (e.g. Ring 2008; Santos et al. 2015) . All of these instruments are so far less explored in the EU context and are less used by EU Member States but have the potential to complement the existing biodiversity financing policy mix. The use of these fiscal instruments for biodiversity conservation purposes is known to be limited by the overall public revenue available, linking their uptake to the overall reform of environmentally-harmful subsidies which is foreseen to help to redirect public funding with possible negative effects on the environment to more environmentally friendly purposes 2 (Lehman et al. 2011; ten Brink et al. 2014) .
This chapter looks at the opportunities of using fiscal instruments for biodiversity and explores their role in complementing the existing policy mix for biodiversity financing in the EU. It provides an overview of the instruments that can be primarily applicable to support biodiversity conservation, highlights a number of successful examples and concludes with the main lessons learnt, particularly considering their role within the context of the overall framework for biodiversity financing.
The chapter builds on a range of EU-wide assessments that have collected evidence on both the use of fiscal instruments and the effectiveness of the overall financing framework for biodiversity Watkins, Withana and ten Brink forthcoming 2017) . 3 The chapter reflects on four key criteria generally identified as relevant for the success of biodiversity-related funding: (i) conservation effectiveness, (ii) social impacts and legitimacy, (iii) cost-effectiveness and (iv) institutional and legal fit (Ring and Schröter-Schlaack 2011; . Conservation effectiveness refers to the degree to which the level of funding and type and/or chosen mix of funding instruments address the identified conservation needs. Social impacts and legitimacy address the acceptability of the instruments among stakeholders, including perceived fairness and compatibility with societal goals, as well as the legitimacy of decision-making processes in designing and allocating funds, which are known to affect the delivery of conservation results . Building on the relation between the benefits and costs of an instrument, cost-effectiveness reflects the relationship between the conservation results achieved and financial resources used. Finally, the institutional and legal fit explores how well-matched the fiscal instrument is with the existing institutional framework, reflecting the ability of the institutions in place to harness and apply the available funding.
RAISING REVENUES: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES, AND FEES AND CHARGES SUPPORTING BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
Environmental taxes 4 are increasingly recognised as an effective tool to support the implementation of environmental policy objectives and, while in many EU Member States there seems to be a momentum behind environmental tax reform, 5 there is still scope for wider application (Withana et al. 2014) . This is particularly true for environmental taxes concerning natural resource use, including biodiversity, as environmental taxes are still dominated by energy-and transport-related taxes in all EU Member States (Eurostat 2016) . Revenues from environmental taxes can also, in principle, be channelled directly to support biodiversity conservation; nevertheless this is not a common practice as revenues raised by taxes in most cases go into general state budgets.
While a wide range of environmental taxes, including different water-, waste-and materials-related taxes, can have an indirect positive impact on biodiversity by reducing pressure on natural resources, only a limited number of existing environmental taxes support biodiversity conservation efforts directly. Pesticide taxes are an example of the latter.
Pesticides are known to pose significant risks for biodiversity as they can be directly toxic for species, can induce changes in habitats and alter food chains (Isering 2010) . Within the EU only a few Member States have, or have had, pesticide taxes in place, with the majority being based on the amount of active ingredients used in the pesticide (Hogg et al. 2016 ). Nevertheless, Denmark shows a prominent example of an effective approach to pesticide taxes (see BOX17.1).
A wide range of environmental fees and charges 6 are also in place in most EU Member States, some of which have a more direct impact on ecosystems and biodiversity. Those environmental fees and charges which have the most direct impact on biodiversity protection include two main types: (i) recreational user fees and charges, covering hunting and fishing fees (i.e. fees required to be paid as a result of the consumptive use of natural resources), and non-consumptive/tourism user fees (e.g. nature park entrance fees), and (ii) natural resource use fees and charges, linked to for instance forestry charges . While most of these fees are common in EU Member States, only a few examples exist in the EU where the fee, and in particular the revenue raised, are closely tied to biodiversity conservation actions (see BOX17.2).
In general, environmental taxes, and fees and charges have the potential to raise revenues for biodiversity. Furthermore, taxes on pollution BOX 17.1 PESTICIDE TAX IN DENMARK The Danish pesticide tax was introduced in the early 1980s complementing the already existing pesticide fee, which was in place to cover the administrative costs of the pesticide approval processes. Since then, the tax underwent a significant reform in 2013 when the level of environmental and human health risk was incorporated to the tax rates, and in particular an environmental load indicator was introduced based on the pesticides' toxicity.
Ecological effectiveness: One of the drivers of introducing the new pesticide tax was the ineffectiveness of the earlier approach. Even though the new pesticide tax is expected to achieve significant positive impacts on the environment it is still too early to fully assess its impacts and the impacts of a pesticide tax on the status of biodiversity in agricultural ecosystems have not been studied in any direct manner yet. However, given the knowledge on negative impacts of pesticide use on biodiversity, observed reduction in pesticide use can be considered as a proxy indicator for ecological improvements.
Social impacts and legitimacy: Given the focus on not only the environmental but also the health impacts of the pesticide taxes, the banded systems clearly have an important implication on human health. In terms of social acceptance, an interesting aspect of the tax is that revenues collected are fully reimbursed into the agriculture sector via reduced land value rates. This was found to be an important factor in mitigating the resistance of agricultural actors towards the pesticide tax. At the same time, the new system has led to some illegal pesticide imports. It is however difficult to assess the extent of such illegal activities.
Cost-effectiveness: In 2013, the pesticide tax raised DKK 659 million (EUR 88.3 million) (Hogg et al. 2016) . After the 2013 reform, it was expected that revenues will stay around DKK 650 million annually. Nevertheless, as a result of a hoarding effect taking place in the early years after the introduction of the new system, the revenues are expected to only stabilise after 2016/17.
Institutional and legal fit: The evolvement of the tax -initially having only pesticide fees covering administrative costs, which were then complemented by a VAT tax, which were then essentially reformed in 2013 by taking into consideration environmental and health risks related to pesticide use -suggests that the aim of the government was to find the approach which was fit for purpose and suited the existing institutional and legal setting. Within the broader institutional context, Denmark is also one of the pioneers in a sense that it had already established pesticide use reduction action plans in the late 1980s, with pesticide taxes playing an important role in achieving the targets. The action plan is likely to have provided a supportive policy framework for the adoption of the taxes, appropriately placing them into the broader institutional and legal framework.
Source: based on Pedersen forthcoming 2017 BOX 17.2 SALMON FISHING LICENCES IN IRELAND
Since 2007, the Irish licencing scheme for angling and commercial fishing of salmon, targeting both wild salmon and sea trout, has included a dedicated share (50 per cent) of the licence fee earmarked to contribute to the Salmon Conservation Fund (SCF). The fund is used to finance salmon conservation measures. The licencing scheme helps to regulate the fishing pressure on the salmon stocks while the revenue provided by the licencing provides an important source of funding for conservation actions.
Ecological effectiveness: The conservation regime is delivering improvements in terms of the status of salmon habitats. The licence scheme is generally considered an integral part of this success, guaranteeing ongoing funding for conservation (e.g. restoration of salmon habitats) and directing fisheries stakeholders to support the maintenance and recovery of stocks. However, the licencing system can only target salmon fishing in the inland water habitats of the species, leaving the marine habitats of salmon unaddressed. Consequently, efforts to restore river and coastal habitats have only yielded limited improvements in salmon stocks. This highlights the importance of placing funding mechanism in the wider policy mix relevant for the species' survival.
Social impacts and legitimacy: The establishment of a more stringent conservation and management regime was underpinned by indisputable scientific evidence on the diminishing salmon fish stocks, leading to a consensus among stakeholders. Despite the differing stakeholder opinions as regards the more detailed measures, this evidence-based consensus played a key role in underpinning the legitimacy of the regime. The adoption of the earmarked licence fee was accompanied with more stringent fishing quotas, resulting in a significant reduction in the numbers of commercial salmon fishermen. Applying the increase in the licencing fee across all stakeholders, including both commercial and recreational fishermen, helped to balance the burden between the key stakeholder groups and improve the acceptance of the overall reform.
Cost-effectiveness: The amount of revenue collected through the licencing system has varied between over EUR 600 000 per year in the early years to just over EUR 500 000 per year in recent years, reflecting the declining number of people purchasing the licence. The revenue is directly channelled to support conservation projects prioritising salmon rivers most in need of rehabilitation. Given the evidence of ecological effectiveness, the earmarked salmon licencing system appears to be a cost-effective means for salmon conservation in the inland water habitats. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions as regards the cost-effectiveness of the overall salmon conservation regime, including the marine element.
Institutional and legal fit: The licencing scheme is an element of the broader salmon tagging scheme, with both the tagging and licencing being underpinned by dedicated legislation 7 . Both the licencing scheme and the SCF are managed by the same administrative body -Inland Fisheries Ireland -that is also responsible for the conservation and sustainable management of salmon stocks. This means that the key financing instrument for salmon conservation is well embedded in the broader institutional framework for salmon protection, providing a fit-for-purpose premise for harnessing and applying the funding. and resource use are important tools in achieving environmental objectives (Withana et al. 2014) . Nevertheless, the use of those which directly support biodiversity protection are still minor compared to those which target other environmental areas, and in many cases revenues arising from such instruments are not linked back to fund conservation actions. Environmental taxes have the potential to raise greater revenues compared to environmental fees and charges, however since this revenue is redistributed through general budgets, competition with other policy priorities for funding limits the opportunities for channelling the revenue towards biodiversity conservation (e.g. ).
PROVIDING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION: TAX RELIEFS
With the use of those tax relief mechanisms that support biodiversity protection, 8 taxpayers who comply with specified nature conservation requirements can receive exemptions from general taxes. Tax reliefs can cover a broad range of incentivising mechanisms, including tax exemptions, tax reductions and tax benefits, and are linked to nature areas or investments in biodiversity protection actions. Most commonly, tax reliefs relevant for conservation purposes can be categorised into three types (Shine 2004; Oosterhuis 2011 ): (i) land/or property tax reliefs linked to undeveloped land, (ii) inheritance, capital gains, gifts and transfer tax reliefs used when a specified land is transferred from one owner to another, either as a result of the death of the original owner or as part of a donation, and (iii) income and corporate tax relief linked to expenses or investments in nature.
Tax reliefs that support biodiversity conservation objectives are only used in a limited number of countries, with the most developed system within the EU currently existing in France where various tax incentives are in place supporting nature conservation objectives specifically linked to the EU Natura 2000 sites (see BOX 17.3).
Overall, as tax reliefs by nature are not aimed at providing funding for conservation purposes, their main role is to incentivise general taxpayers to use their land in a biodiversity-friendly way. At the same time, as general taxes, including tax reliefs, are not designed in a way that conservation objectives can be easily included in them, their main role could be to maintain nature areas in their current status rather than to incentivise land users to undertake specific conservation actions and deliver conservation gains (Illes and Ratliff 2017) .
BOX 17.3 TAX RELIEFS SUPPORTING BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION IN FRANCE
Since the mid-2000s France has developed a tax relief system supporting conservation objectives with current exemptions from three taxes: (i) property tax for undeveloped property on Natura 2000 sites 9 , (ii) inheritance tax for the transfer via succession or gift of unbuilt property located on a Natura 2000 site, and (iii) income tax for Natura 2000 site management costs. The exemptions are conditional as land owners need to comply with certain management practices that are set out by specific contractual tools, the so-called Natura 2000 Contracts and Natura 2000 Charters, agreed upon between the landowners and the local authorities. While the Contract enables signatories to receive tax exemptions from inheritance and property taxes it does not provide financial support for the management of Natura 2000 sites, for which only those landowners who commit to the Natura 2000 Charters are eligible.
Ecological effectiveness: Landowners are required to enter contractual commitments for long-term periods, which serve to maintain the ongoing management of the land in question. The property tax exemption is first provided for a period of five years and is renewable. Those who receive an exemption from the inheritance tax are required to enter an 18-year contract and commit to the site's conservation objectives. While the long-term conservation benefits seem to be ensured with these long-term agreements, there is a general lack of biodiversity-related indicators and thus the proper monitoring of the overall conservation effectiveness of the system is challenging.
Social impacts and legitimacy: The tax relief scheme is considered to provide an important role in overcoming the social rejection of the Natura 2000 network among French landowners, yet the uptake of the various tax reliefs is still considered to be low.
Cost-effectiveness: While the cost of the tax relief system is relatively low for the State, this might be the result of a low uptake. There also seems to be a divide between various governance levels with regards to the fiscal aspects of the tax relief, in particular the property tax exemptions, as the compensation from the State for the loss of earning resulting from the unbuilt land property tax exemption has been progressively lowered since 2009, which has started to create problems at the regional level as there is no independent source of revenue for the regions.
Institutional and legal fit: There is a need to better assess the combined effect of the French tax relief system and other financial incentives, such as grant funding from the EU, in order to avoid double compensation and to fully understand how tax relief fits into the overall policy mix.
Source: Based on Illes and Ratliff 2017.
DISTRIBUTING FUNDS FOR BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION: ECOLOGICAL FISCAL TRANSFERS (EFT)
EFT are a mechanism aimed at redistributing the overall tax revenue (i.e. non-earmarked revenue) between different government levels by using ecological criteria, most commonly the coverage of protected areas (e.g. Grieg-Gran 2000; Ring 2011; Santos et al. 2012) . The logic for ecological criteria is that regions are compensated for the opportunity costs arising from conservation and that, while being provided with financial resources, regional and local authorities also feel incentivised to support conservation efforts. For example, the decisions about protected areas are primarily taken by the higher levels of governance that have the overview of the country's protected area network, while costs of withholding the designated areas from other uses are predominantly borne at the local level (e.g. Santos et al. 2012) . Consequently, while fiscal transfers are not strictly speaking meant to work as a direct incentive, the use of ecological criteria for tax redistribution at subnational levels can help to indirectly incentivise biodiversity conservation (Santos et al. 2012) . In more direct terms, EFT schemes can, in principle, be designed so that the revenue linked to the ecological criteria is earmarked to support conservation activities on the ground. Within the EU Portugal is the only country that has implemented EFT schemes on a broader scale (see BOX 17.4).
Based on the existing information (e.g. from Portugal), the prerequisite for EFT to deliver conservation results is the existence of competencies at municipal level, in particular in terms of the authority of municipal stakeholders over designated protected areas. The findings from Portugal indicate that the slight increase in the number of protected areas may be associated with the introduction of EFT (e.g. Ring et al. 2017) . In Brazil, where EFT have been implemented in several states since 1991, there is a clear trend visible where more protected areas have been designated in states with EFT compared to states without the instrument, and this especially holds true at the municipal level (Droste et al. 2015; Ring et al. 2017) .
The lack of earmarking means that EFT do not directly contribute to the resources available to carry out biodiversity conservation actions. To a certain extent this limits the usefulness of EFT in their current form as an instrument for delivering biodiversity objectives. However, even without the earmarking, EFT can be a beneficial element in the overall instrument mix for financing biodiversity, as they can contribute to the willingness of maintaining a certain baseline of conservation efforts at a local level, e.g.
BOX 17.4 ECOLOGICAL FISCAL TRANSFERS IN PORTUGAL
The Portuguese EFT scheme, in place since 2007, uses the EU Natura 2000 sites and other nationally protected areas for redistributing public revenue from the national to the local level. The scheme aims to address the distributional bias between the costs of conservation actions occurring at the municipal level and the more diffused benefits of these actions. EFT are integrated into the broader system of fiscal transfers, with 5 to 10 per cent of one of the key national tax-based funding instruments for municipalities (i.e. the Municipal General Fund) being distributed according to the share of the national protected area network (Natura 2000 sites and protected areas) 'hosted' by the municipality.
Ecological effectiveness: There has been a slight increase in the coverage of protected areas in Portugal since the establishment of the EFT scheme. However, it is not possible to say how much of this increase can be attributed to EFT. The EFT payments are designed as lump-sum payments to municipalities, leaving the municipalities with the freedom to decide upon the use of funds. Hence, the EFT payments are not directly linked to the delivery of conservation actions and therefore they do not provide any direct financing for biodiversity conservation. This can limit the ecological effectiveness of the payments. Furthermore, the adoption of EFT in 2007 was accompanied with other simultaneous changes in the fiscal transfer system, leading to crossover effects between different distribution criteria when distributing the revenue to municipalities. Consequently, the ecological criteria are not sufficient to counterbalance other effects, failing to provide a visible enough incentive to several municipalities.
Social impacts and legitimacy: EFT's underlying focus is to address the consequences of central governance decision-making at the municipal level. In Portugal, direct fiscal transfers from central government are an important source of revenue for municipalities (around 60 per cent in average). Consequently, EFT can play a positive role in supporting the legitimacy of biodiversity conservation among municipal stakeholders. However, the current lack of transparency masking the ecological component of the fiscal transfer system hinders the enhancement of conservation legitimacy.
Cost-effectiveness: EFT are part of the existing fiscal transfer schemes and therefore the transaction costs of introducing them are relatively low. However, the evidence of ecological effectiveness and legitimacy indicate that the lack of earmarking and 'invincibility' of the ecological signal makes EFT in their current form not the most cost-effective way of incentivising the establishment and management of the Portuguese protected area network.
Institutional and legal fit: The conservation incentive created by EFT is targeted to municipal actors. Therefore, in order to yield to concrete results, EFT need an institutional framework where municipal actors have the competence to take conservation actions. In the case of Portugal, the introduction of EFT was followed by legislative changes that allowed local authorities to designate a wider category of protected areas (e.g. private protected areas).
Source: Based on Santos et al. 2012; Ring et al. 2017. even during times of financial difficulties. This requires, however, the EFT to be clearly recognisable to the municipal stakeholders, both in terms of the criteria itself and the amount of revenue allocated.
CONCLUSIONS
The review of the existing application of the above instruments for biodiversity highlights the importance of a number of key aspects.
Firstly, earmarking revenues (back) to support conservation activities seems an effective way to deliver concrete biodiversity benefits. Fees and charges are the most suitable fiscal instruments for this purpose, however earmarking can also be integrated into the design of taxes and EFT. If applicable and well-designed, earmarking can offer an effective way to help to bridge the existing biodiversity funding gap, in particular if facilitated by and linked to the ongoing efforts in reforming environmentally harmful subsidies (ten . However, even without earmarking, fiscal instruments can be a beneficial element in the overall policy mix for financing biodiversity, contributing to the general baseline for environmental and nature conservation. The review also highlights the importance and, with the exception of the Irish salmon fishing licence, the general absence of appropriate monitoring and indicators in place to be able to estimate concrete conservation outputs of financing. Such information is required when considering the interplay and opportunities for different biodiversity funding instruments in the overall funding mix, including their cost-effectiveness (see below). While the reduction of the funding gap for biodiversity is essential, the lesser the pressure on biodiversity, the lesser the need will be to finance biodiversity conservation. Any strategy on financing biodiversity therefore also needs to look at how to reduce the pressures driving biodiversity loss.
As regards social impacts and legitimacy, various actors such as national governments, regional authorities and general taxpayers play a role in implementing the different instruments. While guaranteeing sufficient and well-targeted funding for biodiversity protection is key to achieving the EU's biodiversity objectives, the social acceptance of funding mechanisms among different stakeholders is also a crucial factor for success. An objection towards funding mechanisms by stakeholders can be -and has been known to be -a substantial barrier, for instance by hindering the take-up of grant funding . Therefore, unsurprisingly, the review of fiscal instruments supporting biodiversity conservation highlighted that social impacts and legitimacy, such as fair distribution of the regulative burden associated with the regime, should be an integral part of a well-designed instrument (e.g. the Danish pesticide tax and the Irish salmon fishing licence).
The results of the review provide a mixed picture about cost-effectiveness and, given the general lack of detailed analysis on this aspect, no overarching conclusions can be made. In general, the level of administrative burden and transaction costs depend on the overall design of the instrument, as well as on the national policy mix within which the instrument is applied. The level of uptake of the instrument also has important implications, as for instance was shown in the French tax relief system. Low uptake of an instrument might limit the administrative burden, but it also diminishes the potential ecological effectiveness of the scheme.
Finally, the review demonstrates that one of the key factors in ensuring the successful uptake of fiscal instruments for biodiversity is ensuring they fit with and are supported by the broader policy, institutional and legislative framework, including the frameworks for both financing and also more broadly conserving the environment and nature. Complementing requirements include, for example, instruments in places for sustainable management and monitoring of natural resources (e.g. the Irish salmon fishing licences), the appropriate extension of land use decisions to local level (e.g. the Portuguese EFT) and the support and impetus provided by a broader policy framework (e.g. the Danish Pesticide Action Plan).
In conclusion, the uptake of fiscal instruments has a clear potential for increasing financing for biodiversity and supporting conservation objectives. This can include raising revenue to finance conservation activities, providing financial incentives to support biodiversity-friendly practices or using distribution of tax-related funds as a means to compensate for and motivate conservation efforts. Rather than being alternatives to one another, these instruments can generally complement each other while also fitting into the overall policy mix providing financing for biodiversity. "that confers an advantage on consumer or producers, in order to supplement their income or lower their costs, but in doing so, discriminates against sound environmental practices" (Withana et al. 2012 ). 3. See acknowledgements for full project references. 4. An environmental tax is "a tax whose tax base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it) of something that has proven negative impact on the environment" (Eurostat 2016). 5. Environmental tax reform refers to "changes in the national tax system where the burden of taxes shifts from economic functions, sometimes called 'goods', such as labour (personal income tax), capital (corporate income tax) and consumption (VAT and other indirect taxes), to activities that lead to environmental pressures and natural resource use, sometimes called 'bads'" (EEA 2005). 6. Environmental charges and fees are "compulsory and requited payments to general government or to bodies outside general government, such as environmental funds or water management boards" (EEA 2005) . Unlike taxes, fees and charges are introduced on the basis of an equivalence principle. 7. Fisheries (Amendment) Act, No. 35 of 1999. 8. Tax reliefs supporting biodiversity protection are "arrangements and provisions in general tax schemes, with the explicit aim of providing positive financial incentives steering the taxpayers' behaviour in a more biodiversity-friendly direction" (Oosterhuis 2011). 9. Closely linked to this tax relief, the state provides financial compensation to local and regional authorities to compensate for their loss of revenues resulting from the unbuilt land property tax exemptions.
